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PREFACE
TIlere ~s, currently, a flurry of activity as the present Administration,
along with the United States Department of Energy and the United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, struggles to develop a comprehensive national
program for the management and disposal of radioactive wastes. That such a
program has been long overdue in its birthing reflects ill upon the federal
government; the seriousness of this shortcoming is only compounded by the
wide range of technical, environmental, and socio-political problems
besetting the issue of disposal. Because of these problems, the emerging
program should be closely monitored by the individual states, particularly
those states within whose boundaries a nuclear waste repository might
be sited. If the waste management program is to be truly national in
its scope, then no state should be precluded from having an effective
voice in the development of the program.
This, then, is the subject of this paper. The first section of the
paper deals with some of the inherent technical issues. This includes
a review of the origin of nuclear wastes; the hazards of the wastes,
including impacts upon the biological environment; and the extent of
the state of the art for disposing of such wastes. The second section
~s an attempt to review the scope of the federal program, from its genesis
to its uncertain future. Although the commercial use of nuclear material
was first permitted in the 1950's, it was not until the 1970's that an
attempt was made to statutorily clarify which federal agency was responsible
for the ever-increasing stockpile of nuclear waste; and it has only been in
recent years that a comprehensive program has been conceived. Thus, review
of a limited and inconsistent federal program of past years is followed by
an examination of the present embryonic program. This is then succeeded
by a discussion of the role of indivi~ual states as godparents to the
federal program.
However, the extent to which an individual state has a voice in the
program is affected by complex legal considerations. It is the contention
of the federal government that a state may contribute a voice only When
permitted to do so. An attempt is made to outline the basis for this
federal assertion, first, through a general decision of the degree to
which a federal law may supercede the rights of a state (the preemption
doctrine); then, a review of litigation and its impact upon the state
role is made. Finally, although the general concensus of judicial opinion
seems to be adverse to a state's desire to assert some authority in the
area, suggestions are advanced as to possible legal tools whereby the
state might exert itself.
Additionally, there may be other means nf which a state might avail
itself: the development of administrative law is not without its benefits.
Hence, a section of the paper addresses some of the procedural devices
available to a state. The first of these arises as a result of the mandated
preparation of an environmental impact statement by involved federal
agencies. The state may either try to affect the process during the
preparation of the statement, or subsequently, challenge the adequacy
(thoroughness) of the document. Additionally, it is suggested that if
a state possesses a sound basis for contesting the siting of a nuclear
waste ~epository within its boundaries, it may wish to present this evidence
to interested federal agencies prior to an administrative commitment bp.ing
made to a particular site.
ii
The paper is, thus, a synopsis of some of the myriad issues implicit
in the management of nuclear wastes. It relys extensively upon the many
examinations which have been made of varied aspects of the topic; a review
of authorities cited within the paper provides but a brief glimpse of
the abundance of such literature. Finally, it should be noted that,
where feasible, discussion is made with reference to a particular state
Louisiana -- as areas within that state have received considerable attention
from the federal government as a prime candidate for a nuclear waste
disposal site.
iii
T. Technical Issues Immanent in the Management of Commercial Nuclear Waste
A. Introduction
Due to the ever increasing uncertainties of the world fossil fuel
supply, it appears that this country will continue to rely upon nuclear
power to satisfy its energy appetite. As with all sources of energy utilized
by the modern world, nuclear energy generates more than power, it also
generates environmental problems. l Yet, if nuclear energy is to be a
politically acceptable source, now is the time for governmental institutions
to begin to resolve some of the serious and complex problems raised by the
2
nuclear process. In particular, the problem of what to do with the highly
toxic radioactive wastes created by nuclear power is one of the most important
issues yet to be resolved in planning for the future development of nuclear
power.
Radioactive wastes are generated from a wide variety of activities
including research investigations, medical diagnostics and therapy, mining
of uranium ore, defense-related nuclear activities, and the operation
of commercial nuclear power plants. During the last thirty years, defense-
related nuclear activities produced most of the radioactive wastes in
terms of volume and radioactivity. However, now and as projected for
the future, the radioactive waste generation rate of the defense-related
programs is about constant and small in relation to that of nuclear power
plants. The commercial nuclear power industry has grown tremendously
since the 1960's and, as a result, has now generated more radioactive
waste (measured in terms of cumulative radioactivity) than past Qefense-
related activities and can be expected to grow in accord with the federal
government1s encouragement of such development.
\.
B. Nature of Nuclear Wastes
Radioactive wastes are produced at several points 1n the nuclear
fuel cycle; during the milling of uranium ore, the operation of nuclear
power plants, the reprocessing of spent fuel, and the fabrication of
fuel containing plutonium. The largest quantities of radioactivity,
and thus, the greatest potential hazards result from the actual reactor
processes. These wastes from the "back end" of the fuel cycle include
low-level ("contaminated") waste, high-level waste from reprocessing
activities, and spent fuels which have not been reprocessed.
Low-level wastes contain small quantities of transuranic contaminants
per gram of material or they may be free of transuranic contaminants.
They require little or no shielding and have low, but potentially hazardous,
concentrations or quantities of radionuclides. Low-level wastes are
generated in almost all activities involving radioactive materials and
are presently disposed of by shallow land burial.
Transuranic wastes result predominantly from spent fuel reprocessing,
the fabrication of plutonium to produce nuclear weapons, and if it should
occur, plutonium fuel fabrication for recycle to nuclear reactors. These
wastes have long half-lives (toxic periods) and must be absolutely contained
for the hundreds of thousands of years that are required for the radioactivity
to decay to innocuous levels. 3
High-level wastes (HLW) are either intact fuel assemblies that are
being discarded after serving their useful life in a nuclear reactor (spent
fuel or the portion of the wastes generated in the reprocessing of spent
fuel that contains virtually all of the fission products and most of the
2
actinides not separated out during reprocessing. These wastes present
the greatest short-term health hazards due to their emissions of intense
, . d' ".. 4rad~oactiv~ty an h~gh tox~c~ty ~n m1nute amounts. These factors, when
combined with their long radioactive life, high levels of radioactivity,
and generation of intense heat, present many difficult problems with
5
respect to disposal which have yet to be resolved. And, as pursuant
to the present Administration's non-proliferation policy, the federal
government will accept spent fuel from other countri~s,6 the volume of
these wastes can be expected to grow disproportionately to our own development
of commercial nuclear power. Thus, both the volume and the dangerous
toxicity of these wastes emphasize the critical need for a safe method
of isolation from the biosphere.
C. Environmental Aspects of Commercial Nuclear Wastes
The fission process which occurs in nuclear reactors produces large
quantities of man-made radioactive materials which are so harmful to
life that they must be isolated from the biosphere for extraordinarily
long periods of time. Again, exactly how long a period of isolation
is needed is still a subject of controversy; opinions vary from several
h d d 1 'II' 7 " 11 dun re to severa m1 10n years; yet, 1t L6 genera y agree that a
thousand years is a minimum requirement. The special hazards of these
wastes result from the emission of radi~tion the effects of which
are cumulative and not readily discernible, but which may include the
development of cancer and/or genetic damage, Thus, radiation exposure
now can harm generations yet to be born.
Radionuclides are toxic in two aspects: chemical toxicity and radioactive
damage. While the direct effects of radionuclides have been vaguely
3
defined, what reaches humans through environmental pathways is not clear:
chronic effects are even less understood. The problem is especially cODlplicated
as many radioactive elements do not disperse in the environment, but concentrate
in some plants and animals, thereby affecting the entire food chain. Further-
more, unlike most other environmental contaminants with which we are familiar,
there is no method of altering the period of time in which a particular
species of radionuclide remains radioactive. Each radionuclide decays
at its own particular rate, regardless of temperature, pressure, or chemical
environment. Presently, the only practical means of mitigating the hazards
of radioactive wastes is to allow the radionuclides to decay naturally,
a process ranging from the hundreds of years for the bulk of the fission
products to millions of years for certain of the actinide elements and
longer-lived fission products.
The toxicit~ of radioactive wastes comes from the ionizing radiation
emitted as alpha, beta, and gamma rays. The action of these emitted
rays is to break bonds in molecules within the cells. 8 The result may
be minor when only affecting the multiple proteins, but the action on
the unique DNA chromosome strands can lead to various immediate and long-
term effects. A property of radioactive wastes that makes them particularly
insidious is the transformation process they exhibit called transmutation.
The radioactive elements, which are inherently unstable, will change in
their size and form as the nucleus of the atom becomes its parts, e.g.,
radioactive uranium, a solid fuel caD become radioactive radon, a gas:
numerous heavy metals result as part of this transmutation process.
In the aquatic environment, radionuclides are added to the sediment
by deposition of particles associated with the nuclides or by the movement
4
of radionuclides through the sediment itself. It is thought that accumulation
of radionuclides by aquatic organism is most likely to occur if radionuclides
are introduced into an area of high biological activity where there is a
shortage of trace elements. Accumulation is also thought to be enhanced
in areas of acidic sediments. 9
In addition to specific directed studies of radionuclides, the influence
of other environmental factors must be considered. Lethal amounts of
acute radioactivity differ widely among organisms and are related to
such variations as age, physiological status, and body size, These variations
are further complicated by the fact that the possibilities for damage to
organisms will probably increase through the combination and interaction
f d 'ff . 1 f f . I . 10o ~ erent enV1ronmenta actors, such as the presence 0 chemtca carcinogens.
At low level exposure, there is within an organism a repair mechanism
that repairs damaged cells before a cancer can form. The dose that mutates
the maximum number of cells that can be repaired could be considered the
threshold dose. (The question of whether or not there 1S a threshold
level below which exposure does not affect an organism is a subject of
considerable controversy within the scientific community -- as to all
types of pollutants.) If there is already present so much of a pollutant
that cancers produced by it are cornman, an additional dose of this pollutant
or any dose of a pollutant which gives cancer by the same 'mechanism is
thought to produce an effect that may be greater than any incremental
11dose. For example, radiation reaches all parts of the body and produces
cancers at essentially all sites: in contr~st, chemical carcinogens tend
to discriminate in favor of certain sites, i.e., the liver. Thus, a chlorinated
5
hydrocarbon may not be a direct carcinogen but may only become carcinogenic
due to products of metabolites (induced by radionuclides) in the liver.
These considerations emphasize the eritical need for a viable method of
isolating radioactive wastes.
D. Disposal of Commercial Nuclear Wastes
However, the management of radioactive wastes for the part thirty
years has been said to be characterized by the inadequate integration
of waste management research and development efforts with those for other
12parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. The "mindset" of the federal regulatory
agencies has been that the technology would somehow s~ontaneously arise
full blown from Zeus' head concomitan.t with the irmnediacy of need for
d · 1 1 . 13a lsposa so utlon. This is due to insufficient attention to developing
the needed technological and scientific capabilities and to low funding
levels compatible with a narrow approach towards HLW disposal (one geologic
medium-salt, and few sites).
At present, most cormnercially gener.ated wastes are stored in temporary
water cooling ponds on the reactor sites. However, besides the environmental
15problems raised by this make-shift technology, there are other serious
1ssues raised_ For instance, as long as spent fuel, or any other radioactive
waste, is stored on the surface, it is susceptible to sabotage. Furthermore,
many commercial nuclear power plants are nearing the upper limits of their
d - d - f' -I - 16 (D d·eS1gne capac1ty or storlog wastes temporarl y on s1te. epen 1ng
upon reactor type, nearly a third of the reactor fuel core must be removed
each year.) Thus, besides the dangers posed, these problems will inevitably
result in increased costs of storage which will be passed on to the utility
6
consumer (costs which were probably not quantified in the initial justification
for the construction of the nuclear power facility).
Efforts have been initiated to deal with thi~ di16nma within a short
time span. The Interagency Review Group Report on Nuclear Waste Management
(IRG) has identified several candidate technologies for disposal:
-placement 1n mined repositories,
-placement 1n deep ocean sediment,
-placement in very deep drill holes,
-placement in a mined cavity in a manne~ that leads to rock melting,
-partitioning of reprocessing waste, transmutation of heavy radionuclides,
and geologic disposal of fission products, and
. .. 17
-ejectIon Into space.
The IRG suggests that the technology of placement into mined geologic
repositories1 8 is the most readily available, with deep ocean emplacement
and deep drill hole disposal another ten to fifteen years from implementation.
The other technologies are more difficult at this time because of scientific,
engineering, or institutional problems. Although the present extent
of knowledge IS most complete for mined repositories, and in particular
those within salt formations l there are still significant gaps and uncertainties
. h' 1 d d' 19In our current tec nlca un erstan lng. Furthermore, although present
acientific and technical knowledge is adequate to identify potential
repository sites, the long toxic period of HLW requires certainties of
safe isolation not yet within the state of the art; for instance, beyond
a few thousand years, the capability to assess the performance of the
repository site diminishes and, consequently, the degree of assured safety
20is thereby reduced.
7
It is precIsely because of these considerations that the IRG endorses
a "systems" approach fo'r the selection of the geologic environment, repository,
and waste form. The physical and chemical properties of the medium must
be relied upon as well as engineered barriers (such as waste form, container,
and density of emplacement) to provide multiple, and to some extent, indepenclent,
nqtural and engineered barriers to the release of radionuclides to the
b ' 211.osphere. Geologic burial combines the advantage of isolation from
hence,
the biosphere, minimum surveillance, and minimum risk of inadvertant
I f d · .. 22re ease 0 ra 1.oactl.vl.ty.
Research on disposal in salt deposits in the longest pursued and
23furthest advanced. Salt deposits are a leading candidate
for a repository because the presence of salt indicates a general absence
of circulating groundwater, the principal mechanism of transporting radioactive
waste to the surface where it would enter the biosphere. Salt is abundant
and easily mined. It conducts heat reaclily, shield well against radiation,
and is structurally strong. Further, salt flows plastically under pressure
and would seal cracks which would otherwise result in the release of
d · I'd 24ra l.onuc 1. es. However, salt is not without its disadvantages, precisely
althaugh the brine would not
because of the plasticity of salt, the repository openings will have a
tendency to close due to the flow in molecules resulting from heat generated
25by the waste. The heat generating properties of the waste reveal another
problem: certain brine deposits would tend to migrate towards the heat
. . d d h 26generatl.ng contal.ners an carro e t em
transport radioactivity to the surface in the same manner as groundwater.
Additionally, salt is itself soluble and does not provide the sorptive
qualities of other rock types nor is it benign to interactions with the
8
"The paramount concern of Congress
waste or the container. 27 Finally, salt formations are often located
in areas where oil, gas, or potash is found -- which, of course, increases
the possibility of human intrusion.
II. The Federal Role in Nuclear Waste Hanagement
A. The Role of the Atomic Energy Cormnission
The Atomic Energy Act (AliA) of 1946 delegated to the Atomic Energy
Comnllssion (AEC) broad regulatory authority over source, by product,
d . 1 1 . 1 28an spec1a nuc ear materla s.
was the assurance of the common defense and security in the development
29
and utilization of nuclear power II , since the principal use of nuclear
energy aE that time was for military purposes. In recognition of scientific
and technical advances in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes, Congress amended the AEA in 1956 to encourage private, commercial
development of nuclear power: the development, use, and control of nuclear
energy was now to be directed "so as to make the maximum contribution to
the general welfare, subject at all times to the paramount object of
k · I .' 'b' h d f d ." 30rna 1ng tle maX1mum contr1 ut~on to t e common e ense an secur1ty
The 1956 amendment created a licensing scheme in which the AEC would
authorize the private ownership of nuclear by product and the rental of
special nuclear material for commercial purposes. 3l The federal government
limited possession of special nuclear materials to AEC licensees. The AEA
now authorized the AEC to establish such standards "as ... it deemed necessary
or desireable to promote the common defense and security or to protect
h 1 . .. d 1'e: " 32ea th or to m1n1m1ze anger to 1ke or property .
9
Further amendments in 1959 reflected a desire to effectuate a coordinated,
orderly, and effective regulatory plan and clarify the interrelationship of
33the states and the AEC; the amendments established the re~pective
responsibilities of the states and the AEC in regulating source, by product,
and s.pecial nuclear materials, including the licensing of low-level waste
land disposal operations; however, the AEC could not discontinue regulatory
authority over special nuclear materials in quantities sufficient to form
a critical mass. Essentially, the amendments provided that the ARC would
turn over to the states, as they became qualified, certain defined areas
f 1 " d' . 34. 1 d' 1 d" h d 35o regu atory Jur1S 1ct10n, 1nc u 1ng contra over ra 1atH)fi '8zar s;
this to be done through the mechanism of a state-AEC agreement. (For
instance, an "agreement" state may regulate the disposal of low-level
waste provided its regulatory program is compatible with the federal
36program.) But notwithstanding these agreements, regulatory jurisdiction
would not be transferred to the states until the AEC determined that the
state had a program for the control of radiation with standards adequate
to protect the public health and safety. In addition, the AEC would
37
retain jurisdiction of certain materials involving special hazards.
It is important to note, however, that "nothing in this (amendment was
t~ be construed to affect the authority of any state or local agency
to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against radiation
38hazards H •
B. The Role of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department
of Energy.
Then, in response to criticism of the dual role of the AEC as both
promoter and regulator of nuclear power, the Energy Reorganization Act
10
(ERA) of 197439 abolished the AEC and separated the regulation of nuclear
power from the promotion of nuclear power. The licensing and related
regulatory functions of the AEC were transferred to a new Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) while the operation of governmental nuclear research and
production facilities were transferred to the Energy Research and Development
Administration (ERDA).40
The ERA made it explicit that the federal government was responsible
41for nuclear waste management; ERDA was specifically assigned the task
of "encouraging and conducting research and development, including demons tration
of commercial feasibility and practical application of the ... storage
42phase ... related to the development of use of energy from ... nuclear sources".
In particular, ERDA was given the responsibility to "develop, demonstrate,
implement and operate high level radioactive waste program", including:
-the storage or permanent disposal of conunercial wastes that
the NRC re~uired to be transferred to federal custody,
-the storage or permanent disposal of wastes generated at facilities
operated by ERDA,
-the development of waste treatment techniques to facilitate storage
or disposal, and
-evaluation of various geologic formations and specific sites
h · • b . 1 . h' h 1 1 .. 43as to t e~r su~ta ~ ~ty as ~g eve waste repos~tor~es.
However, as the ERA provided that the NRC had licensing and regulatory
authority over facilities used primarily for the receipt and storage
of HLW and other facilities authorized for the express purpose of subsequent
44long-term storage, ERDA's National Waste Terminal Storage Program
was
and
subject to NRC regulatory authority except for on-going research
45development.
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Subsequently in 1976, the Department of Energy Organization Act transferred
the activities of ERDA to the Department of Energy (00E).46 As Congressional
intent was to provide "a comprehensive statement of the responsibilities
relating to nuclear waste management",47 DOE was delegated control of
existing government nuclear wastes and was to establish a program for
48
nuclear waste management, including responsibility for all R&D efforts
directed towards commercially feasible technologies. 49
As noted, most HLW is presently stored in liquid or partially solidified
form in underground or above ground storage tanks. Current federal regulations
require that HLW be solidified within five years after reprocessing and that
the solidified waste be delivered to a federal repository within ten years
f . 50a ter reprocess~ng. The commercial industry is responsible for the
interim storage, solidification, and transportation to the repository
site. 5l These repositories will feature interim retrievability of the
f f · f' 52waste or 1ve to twenty- ~ve years; however, after this initial period.
the repository will be sealed for permanent disposal of the wastes at
which point the NRC takes title to the site. S3 Finally, disposal of
HLW is not permitted except on land owned and controlled by the federal
54government. Unfortunately. there are several complications with the
present scheme. First. commercial reprocessing has been indefinately
postponed;55 thus, current regulations have llinited applicability. Further,
the federal government has yet to develop a politically acceptable program
f d ' 1 . 56or ~sposa or a repos~tory.
C. Federal Role in the Future
In a message sent to Congress on February 12, 1980, President Carter
outlined a comprehensive national nuclear waste program: 57 in accord
12
with this Presidential directive, the DOE is now preparing a Nation,al
Plan for Nuclear Waste Management which will include specific program
58goals and milestones for all aspects of nuclear waste management.
A principal component of this program is the official adoption of an interim
planning strategy for HLW focused on the use of mined geologic repositories
capable of accepting both waste from reprocessing and unrQprocesseq commercial
spent fuel. Thus, immediate attention is being given to locating and
characterizing several different potential repository sites. The p~esent
timetable for the program establishes 1985 as the date for choosing the
site of the first full scale repository within which operations are to
begin as soon ther,eafter as technically feasible-approximately the mid-
1990's. 59
The NRC has now issued draft regulations proposing a licensing procedure
for geologic disposal 60 promulgated pursuant to the authority granted
. h ERA 61 h h' 1 .. . . hI' 1 . .In t e : t e tee n1ca crlterla agalnst whle a lcense app lcatlon
will be reviewed are still under development. The proposed NRC regulations
adopt a scheme similar to the two-tiered construction permit and operating
license stages of commercial nuclear power plants; i.e. there are several
points at which the NRC will rev~ew the DOE disposal program. Additionally,
although present regulations do not list disposal in a geologic repository
as an action requiring preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS),63 the new regulations state that the issuance of a license for
a disposal site will require that an EIS be generated with the NRC as
64the lead agency. Finally, although standards of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) do not presently cover waste disposal sites, such criteria and
13
standards are being developed: the NRC would enforce these EPA standards
through the licensing process as the EPA does not have direct authority
£ '1" 65over waste BCl ltles,
On the technical side, DOE has followed up on the work of its predecessor
agencies, AEC and ERDA, by conducting extensive literature studies and
field wor~ investigations in numerous states in search of a suitable site
for a repository. In particular, considerable attention has been focused
on the Interior Gulf Coast Salt Dome Basins and a substantial amount of
66technical investigation has been on-going for several years. Recent
literature available from the DOE Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation suggests
that these salt domes may be among the first potential repository sites. 67
At present, tests with electrical heaters are being conducted in a salt
mine on Avery Island in Louisiana to assess stresses created by the intense
68h~at generated from HLW.
However, besides the technical problems which remain to be resolved
1n the development of a national HLW program, there are a number of political
and institutional issues which are quite provocative, Thus, the federal
government has also attempted to include socio-political considerations
in the development of a national program.
D. The State Role ~n the Federal Program
Pursuant to the recommendations of the IRG,69 the national waste
management program will include several provisions designed to encourage
a cooperative relationship between the states and the federal government,
For instance, a State Planning Council has been created to advise the
Executive Branch and work with Congress ~n making and implementing decisions
14
d d · 1 70on waste management an ~sposa. Among those to be chosen for the
nineteen member council will be fifteen state governors or other elected
officials: it has been suggested that these members represent a complete
spectrum of states including those that voiced opposition to siting facilities
within their boundaries, states with more neutral views, as well as states
who presently utilize nuclear power plants extensively.7l Generally,
the responsibilities of the Council will be to:
-recommend procedural mechanism for reviewin~ specific federal
plans and programs, including a "consultation and concurrence
process" to develop federal, state, and local cooperation,
-develop detailed waste management plans,
-advise on all aspects of siting and licensing of facilities for
storage and disposal of nuclear wastes,
-advise 0'1'1 proposed federal regulations, standards, ,and criteria
related to nuclear waste management programs, and
-identify and make recommendations on other matters related to
the program.
Another aspect of this pragmatic recognition of the need for increased
state involvement is the proposed "consultation and concurrence process"
to be developed within each affected (potential site host) state. Under
this approach, an affected state would participate in the site identification
d h .. 72an c aracter~zatLon process: it is generally felt that the technical
and socio-political success of the federal program ~s dependent upon the
state having a continuing role with respect to the siting, design, and
construction of a geologic repository. It has been suggested that the
15
"consultation and concurrence process" be directed by the governor of
the affected state.: if concurrence cannot be realized, the issue could
be d .. 73appealed to Congress for a eC1s~on.
1 . G d' 74A so, 1n response to IR recomrnen atlons, the NRC has proposed
regulations designed to foster increased public participation in the NRC
7Slicensing procedure. As the NRC has stated that state concerns should
be identified and addressed at the earliest possible time,76 the DOE
1S required to include within its site characterization report a description
of how the state was involved 77in the site selection process. To further
ensure state involvement, the NRC has proposed, beginning with initial
notification by the DOE of selecting a site for site characterization,
a process whereby the state can actively participate in the licensing
process. States may submit proposals for participation in the review
of the Site Characterization Report and any subsequent license application
78from the DOE, The proposed ways in which a state c~uld participate
are varied: they may
-assist the NRC in reviewing license applications,
- perform other technical assistance work, i.e., environmental
studies,
-perform monitoring for the NRC,
- participate through employment or exchange of state and federal
personnel under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act, or
.. 'h' l' 1" 79
-partlc1pate 10 earlngs on a 1cense app 1cat10n.
Nevertheless, it still appears that despite these new gestures of the
NRC, the central concern of the agency is how to proceed with siting
. . 1 'I 80a federal waste reposltory if state concurrence cannot be obtalned vo untar1 y.
16
Finally, as noted hereinabove, under NRC regulation, disposal of HLW
is not permitted except on land owned and controlled by the federal gov-
ernment. However, increasing public opposition almost ensures the pos-
sibility of a conflict between the federal government and an affected
state. Consistent with an earlier ERDA policy of ceasing HLW-related
activities in any state officially indicating its desire to not have a
repository sited within its boundaries, the state of New Mexico was given
h . h DOE 1 . h' . b ..1 • 81t e rtg t to veto any p an w~t ~n lts ounmar~es. Indeed, the pro-
posed Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico has recently been cancel-
led in the face of such opposition. 82 And in Louisiana, a much milder
form of this kind of deference has been outlined as one aspect of an
83
agreement signed by the Governor of the state and the DOE: unfortunately,
the agreement only states that "to the extent permitted by law, Uhe DOS)
will use their best efforts" to avoid overriding state objection: the
degree of actual deferrence to the state's wishes is somewhat less than
certain under this wording. Thus, despite whether increased state par-
ticipation in the federal program is actually realized~ affected states
will remain concerned with the extent of potential impacts resulting from
a repository sited within their boundaries and the degree to which the
state has legal p~rogatives, if any.
III. Legal Issues Immanent in Commercial Waste Management
A. Introduction
The hazardous nature of »LW disposal creates risks to the health
and safety of persons in the repository area both in present and future
17
generations. The restrict!ons needed to ensure the integrity of the barriers
of the repository system will result in a large area of land becoming
unavailable for other potentially productive uses. 84 The development
may create burdensome demands for housing, schools, and other supporting
services normally provided by the state or its political subdivisions;
traffic patterns may need to be substantially changed,8S All of these
considerations lie within the realm of what is considered traditionally
to be a state's "police power", B~cause of this and because of the health
hazards posed by the generation and disposal of HLW, many states have
enacted legislation within recent years which affects the issue of nuclear
waste management within their jurisdiction.
Some of the state legislation deals specifically with the disposal
of HLW: other statutes address the issue as one aspect of comprehensive
regu la tion of nuc I.ear power facili ties. In general, these s ta tu tes can
be divided into three broad categories: 1) states imposing an absolute
ban on the disposal of wastes within their jurisdiction (a sub-category
within this group consists of those states which impose a ban only on
wastes generated from without the state); 2) states which relate the continued
construction and development of nuclear power plants to the development of a
safe and demonstrable technology for the disposal of wastes; and ) states
which mandate an expression of legislative or popular approval before
d · l' h' h . 'd 86 1 f hI' 1 .~sposa w~t ~n t ,e state IS perm1tte. Tle enactment 0 sue eg~s at10n
by the states raises interesting and complex constitutional ~ssues. The
degree to which the state is "preempted" from the exercise of such authority
depends upon the scope and comprehensiveness of federal laws and regulations,
the degree to which the state legislation may be said to impinge upon
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interstate commerce, the purposes for which the state legislation was
enacted, and the language of the state enactment itself.
A. TIle Preemption Doctrine Generally
The extent to which the federal government may impose its authority
upon the states is gov,erned by the Constitution. The mere fact that
a problem may be said to be national in scope is in itself insufficient: 87
an assertion of overriding federal authority must derive from either:
1) a power explicitedly enumerated by the Constitution, 2) the "necessary
and proper" clause of the Constitution,88 or 3) a power that can reasonably
be inferred from the nature of the federal system. All other powers not so
89delegated to the federal government are reserved to the states. However,
insofar as the federal government acts within the range of constitutional
authority, its statutes may be considered paramount;90 and state laws to
the contrary are said to be "preempted" if they conflict with the federal
91
scheme. Indeed, it has been suggested that the United States Supreme
Court gives more weight to the effect of the Supremacy clause than it
accords to the Tenth Amendment reservation of powers to the states. 92
However, it is important to remember that federal supremacy is not to
93be generally presumed.
A three prong test for determining whether a states' regulation of
a subject may be preempted by federal authority was enumerated in the
first major case considering the preemptive effect of federal nuclear
94Laws. First, where state laws are in such irreconciliable conflict
with federal laws that compliance with both is a f'physical impossibility",
state law must yield. 95 Second, if Congress has "expresslylf declared
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that the federal statute grants exclusive authority, then concurrent or
complementary state regulation within the field is precluded, even absent
a direct conflict. Finally, in instances in which the foregoing are not
,evident; the court may infer an intent to preempt when: 1) the federal
scheme of regulation is so pervasive that there is no room for a state
to assert authority; 2) the federal interest is so established and dominant
that there is a presumption of preemption of state laws on the same subject;
3) the nature of the subject regulated demands uniformity of treatment;
or 4} the state policy would produce a result which would frustrate the
96
objective of the federal law.
Generally, there are four possible federal-state interactions in which
the fate of a particular state r~gulation will be evaluated: these are
direct conflict between t~e statutes, state regulation outside of the
preempted field, concurrent regulation, and complementary regulation:
the latter two instances provide the greatest legal difficulties. 97 If
Congress has expressly declared its intention that a field be preempted,
h . h 1 l' Id b . d 98t en ne~t er concurrent nor camp ,ementary state regu at~on wou e per:nntte .
However, if, ~s has been suggested, recent court decisions indicate a
judicial inclination to uphold state laws if not clearly repugnant to
99federal law, then state regulation must be permitted to supplement federal
programs so long as the federal scheme is not frustrated: indeed, the
"proper approach Gay btU to reconcile the operation of both statutory
schemes with one another rather than holding one completely ousted".
Thus, the question of whether a particular state law is preempted is lar-
gely a matter of statutory construction. If the characteristics of the
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subject call for exclusive nation,al jurisdiction, "preemptionll would be
more favorably received by the courts than where the subject is traditionally
"1 1'1 101oca .
102Indeed, states' rights deserve special consideration by the courts,
especially when the state is exercising its traditional "police powers".
The "police power" authority is inherent in state government: it is one
of the most protected of government powers-and through it, the state may
act to protect the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of its
.. 103 . "1"c1t~zens. Furthermore, the exerC1se by a state of Lts po ~ce powers
may be superceded by the federal government only when the nature of the
regulated subject is such that national uniformity of regulation 15 impliedly
( . l' d ")104 h 1 fnecessary 1mp 1e preempt10n or w en a camp ete ouster a state power
has been clearly and manifestly expressed by Congress (express preemption).105
Generally, the express declaration of preemption by Congress limits the
court's role in determining the balance of power between the federal and
the state governemnt; however, the court must still determine whether or
not Congress meant to invalidate a particular state law. 106 In contrast,
with respect to state statutes based upon the police power, implied preemption
is operative only where there is a direct conflict or a clearly manifested
107Congressional intent to preempt.
B. State Regulation of Nuclear Energy
The general scope of federal law and regulations governing nuclear
energy matters has been discussed supra; however, the extent of those
laws and regulations is germane to any analysis of limitations on state
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regulations within the same area. A great deal of litigation has ensued
since the enactment of the AEC, most of which has resulted in the invalidation
of state statutes; however, even these decisions' suggest areas within
which the state can exert its authority.
1. State Regulation of Radiation Hazards
The seminal case involving the state regulation of radiation hazards
, h f N P M' 108 b h15 t at o' orthern States ower Co, v. ~nn.: su sequent cases ave
la~gely been content to rely heavily on Northern States rather than engage
. . d d ~. 1091n 1n epen ent anaiYS1S. In Northern States, Minnesotahad imposed
radiation emission standards on a nuclear power plant more restrictive
than those approved by the AEC: thUS, the issue to be determined by the
court was whether the federal government had sole authority to regulate
radioactive waste releases from nuclear power plants. Relying on the
language of the AEA, the legislative history, the pervasiveness of the
federal regulatory scheme, and the "need for uniform controls in order
110to effectuate the objectives of Congress", the court found that the
state had no authority to regulate radiation hazards except as specified
111in a state-AEC agreement and an emission limitation could only be
f h f . . d·' h d 112or t e purpose 0 protect1ng aga1nst ra 1at10n azar s.
However, it has been suggested that the analysis in the case should
. 113be accorded less precedent weight than it has gencrally rccc1ved.
For instance, a state law is preempted when Congress has either explicitedly
declared that effe~t in the enactment of a statute or it is implicitedly
114
contained in the structure and purpose of the enactment: as the AEA
is devoid of language explieitedly mandating federal preemption, thcn a
preemption effect may only result if it can be reasonably inferred from
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the structure and purpose of the act. Furthermore, the court should have
"consider{§<u the relationship between state and federal laws as they
C~ .::~ . d d l' d 1 h [--;'Y . II 115'e.er~ lnterprete' an app 1e , not mere y as t ey ,~er;., wrlt ten .
As one of the stated purposes of section 274 of the AEA is to foster co-
operation with the state in regulating nuclear energy, perhaps eventually
terminating federal regulation in order to accord states regulatory re-
'b'l' 116. d lId 1sponsl 1 lty, lt oes not appear to express y prec u e a state aw
regula t ing HLW.
Unfortunately, this whole matter appears to have been glided over
by the Court in Northern States. Although the Eighth Circuit prefaced
its analysis with the aCknowledgement that preemption can be found only
after a determination has been made "that the federal government possesses
the power to regulate in a given area ll , it appeared to accept without
analysis the Congressional declaration of acting upon its (Congress')
"constitutionally granted powers over the common defense and security,
117interstate and foreign commerce, and promotion of the general welfare",
Unfortunately, a mere assertion by Congress that it is acting within the
scope of constitutional authority is insufficient: the court should
have carefully scrutinized this threshold issue before proceeding with
the preemption analysis -- "especially in light of the states' traditional
police power over matters of public health and safety".ll8 Thus, the
case should be strictly limited to its facts: "Northern States involved
preemption based on the commerce clause, not some implied authority of
119Congress to regulate publi€ health and safety"; there is, of course,
120
no general federal police power. Furthermore, insofar as radiation
hazards do not arise in a situation involving or affecting interstate
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commerce (such as the generation of electricity 1n Northern States), the
, 1 fl' 121commerce clause is inappropriate as a baSIS for so e . edera authorIty.
Finally, just as Northern States is important for the precedent which
it set, it is a Iso important for whet it did not do. It did not ru Ie
th a tall s ta te regu la t ion of nuc lear power plan ts was preemp t ed . Indeed,
it is clear from the case, as well as the AEA, that states retain jurisdiction
over such questions as need for facilities, financing of specific proposals,
d I . d' 1 b·t· fl' 122an genera econOffilC an enVlronmenta accepta 1 lty 0 nuc ear proJects.
Additionally, a recent decision of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board of
the NRC provides that states, as well as their political subdivision~l
retain the right to regulate on the basis of economic or environmental
'd . 123conSl eratl0ns. Furthermore, the exact application of Northern States
h b h 1 l · . d b b f d 1 1 . l' L'" 124as een s arp y lmlte y su sequent e era egls atlve aC~lvltles.
2. Regulation for Purposes Other than Protection against Radiation Hazards
As noted, subsection K of section 274 of the AEAl25 provides that:
"nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of
any state or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than
protection against radiation hazards". Thus, even though state-AEC agreements
contemplated by this section may limit the degree to which states may
regulate radiation hazards, states are not necessarily preempted if state
regulations is governed by a purpose other than protection against radiation
hazards. Hence, while a state statute which actually conflicts with or
impedes the effectiveness of a federal scheme will not be permitted regardless
126
of state purpose, and although the issue of whether a conflict exists
127
cannot be determined solely by evaluating the state purpose; the fedeFal
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scheme, as reflected in section 274, explicitedly makes state purpose
, l' fl'" 128 1 1relevant 10 the regu atlon 0 nuc ear act1v1tles: c ear y, states
may regulate nuclear activities for health, safety, and econom1c purposes
d ' , . 129other than ra 1at10n protect10n, Thus, a central question to be resolved
before determining whether a state statute is preempted by federal law
is whether the statute falls within the presumably preempted area of
protection against radiation hazards or within a legitimate area of state
concern,
There are at least three approaches by which the courts may make this
determination. First, the court could assume that if there is a legitimate
purpose to be served by a state law-other than protection against radiation
hazards-it should be presumed to be valid, This method would follow the
doctrine enunciated in u.s. v. O'Brien,130 in which the Supreme Court
stated that "(at is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this
court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the
basis of an alleged illicit motive", A second method would be to review
the statute itself together with all available legislative history 1n
order to determine, as a matter of fact, the primary purpose of the law
in question. Or possibly, the courts would presume that whenever a state
regulation could arguably be considered to be aimed at radiation hazards,
it is invalid in absence of compelling proof to the contrary: this was
the approach of the U.S. District Court in Pacific Legal Foundation, et al.
131
v. State Energy Resources Conservation and DevelOpment Commission, et al.
In this decision, a state statute linking the licensing of nuclear power
1 ff ' f d 1 h f d' l'd 132p ants to an e ect1ve e era waste management sc erne was oun 1nva 1 ,
The judicial record of state statutes regulating different aspects
of nuclear energy is not enviable; yet, it is clear that states must
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take a hard look at potential avenues of challenge ~f they desire to op-
pose the siting of a federal waste repository within their boundaries.
It is possible that guidance towards legislating a constitutional state
statute @r challenging the site designation may be found in recent court
decisions.
C. possible Legal Avenues for an Affected State
1. Challenging the Designation on the Basis of National League of Cities
v. Usery
Hi~torically, the limits placed by the Tenth Amendment upon the Con-
gressional exercise of power deriving from the commerce clause were not
clearly defined. Indeed at one time, the Supreme Court declared that
the commerce power was not to be abridged by any consideration of the
133Tenth Amendment. The culmination of an omnipotent commerce power was
succintly stated in Maryland v. Wirtz when the Court found that Congress
was not constitutionally required to "yield to states save in the perform-
ance of governmental functions",134 At that time, the Court felt that
Congress, acting pursuant to a delegated power, lawfully applied the
federal wage and hour law to non-professional state employees and, thus,
d "1' "135 1overro e counterva1 1ng state 1nterests. However, severa years there-
136
aE ter, a retreat from this pas it ion surfacea in Fry v. U. S. ; the court
announced that the Tenth Amendment "expressly declared the constitutional
policy that Congress may not exercise po~er in a fashion that impairs
the states' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a fed-
137
eral system". The final death toll to an unchallengeable exercise
138
of commerce power was pronounced in National League of Cities v. Usery (NLC).
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In NLC, the Court held that the mlnlmum wage and overtime pay provisions
of the Fair Labor and Standards Act would not be applied to states and their
subdivisions. According to the Court, the exercise of Congressional power
pursuant to the commerce clause is restrained by the Tenth Amendment when
matters "essential to the [state I ~I separate and independent existence
are involved". 139 Thus, "traditional governmental functions" 140 are
constitutionally immune from Congressional legislation absent a showing
of compelling national necessity. Indeed, federal authority is generally
suspect insofar as it displaces the state from its role of providing
socia1 order or making prov is ion for the public welfare, i. e., the "dual
functions of administering the public law and furnishing public services".141
According to one interpretation of NLC, the Court was upholding the
state's role of providing for the interests of its citizens in receiving
. . . 1 . 142
certaln ~mportant soc~a serVlces. Thus, to the extent that a federal
action would affect a state's ability to provide "essential" services, it
may be constitutionally impennissible. To carry this a step further, it
appears that if a federal action may jeopardize the ability of state and
local governments to provide certain services out of their general tax
revenues, this impact upon the tax revenues may be unacceptable.
Several impacts resulting from establishing a federal waste repository
could arguably lead to the invocation of NLC. There will certainly result
a disruption of the economy and tax structure of the subject state.
Adclitionally, the state (and affected local governments) may need to enact
substantial local legislation, employ substantial numbers of additional
governmental employees, and accordingly, expend substantial funds in order
to respond to a federal policy which was imposed upon them. The establishment
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of the repository with its attendent security area will result in the
productivity of that land being lost for present and future generations;
additionally, the state would be deprived of its choice as to how best
protect its environment. 143 Arguably, the magnitude of these impacts
would be so great as to displace the states' freedom to structure those
operations and services generally considered to be in the realm of traditional
governmental functions.
2. Enactment of State Law Regulating Land Use
nle same impacts which could lead to an affected state to challenge
the site designation may form the basis for a valid law prohibiting such
disposal. Indeed, such an approach may be most suitable for those states
within who's boundaries lie salt domes: in addition to salt domes being
considered as a candidate site for a HLW repository, there have also been
suggestions that they be utilized to store other hazardous materials.
A sta.te may wish to enact some form of land use regulation prohibiting
salt domes from being used to store hazardous or dangerous materials.
It is certainly within the purview of a state's police power to enact
land use regulations aimed at avoiding environmental degradation or improper
land usage: environmental concerns are "legitimate local purposes similar
to the states' interests in protecting the health and safety of their
citizens". 144 Furthermore, it is clear that section 274(d) of the AEA
intended to "make it clear that the bill ~id) not impair the state authority
to regulate activities ... for the manifold health, safety, and economic
145purposes". Indeed, a land use statute based upon such grounds may
legitilnately avoid constitutional problems despite the fact that it may
have an incidental relationship to questions of radiation protection. 146
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Furthermore, dictum of the Supreme Court suggests that state bans
of nuclear waste disposal may not be unreasonable burdens on interstate
conunerce. In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,147 the Court held that
a state prohibition of wastes from other states violated the Commerce
clause, but added that not all protectionist regulation by the state was
necessarily unconstitutional: laws which banned importation of items
which by "their very movement risked contagion and other evil, ... did not
discriminate against interstate commerce as such, but simply p~evented
traffic in noxious articles, whatever their origin". 148 New Jersey had
attempted to minimize the adverse environmental effects of solid waste
disposal by prohibiting in-state disposal of out of state wastes. It
appears, however, that insofar as the Court was concerned, New Jersey's
fatal error was that it attempted to ban disposal of out of state wastes
while not imposing similar restrictions on waste generated from within
the state.
The opinion of the Court suggests that it utilized a three-tiered
test to determine the validity of a state statute under the commerce
149
clause. First, state statutes are presumed valid if they do not discriminate
against interstate commerce. If, however, the burden on commerce is excessive
in relation to the local benefits derived from the statute-the statute
is invalid unless the state can demonstrate that the statute promotes
a legitimate state goa.! and there are no adequate nondiscriminatory alternatives.
Finally, those statutes which on the face discriminate against interstate
commerce will be subject to strict scrutinization and most likely be
determined invalid. Therefore, the first point of inquiry is whether
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or not the statute purportedly discriminates against interstate commerce.
The Court clearly held that a state may not discriminate "against articles
of commerce coming from outside the state unless there is some reason,
apart from their origin, to treat them differently".150 Certainly, a
statute that prohibits disposal of particular types of wastes based upon
health, safety, and economic grounds -- regardless of the origin of the
waste~oes not imply a discriminatory approach towards articles of commerce.
Furthermore, it appears that the Interstate Commerce Commission has declined
to exercise jurisdiction over the transport of radioactive wastes on the
grounds that such materials do not have any of the attributes commonly
associated with articles classified as Ilgaods" or "property" under the
151Interstate Commerce Act.
Nevertheless, there arc several drawbacks to this strategy for a state.
If, for instance, radioactive wastes are produced within a state, the
state is faced with the dilemma that it must be responsible for those
wastes which are a byproduct of the state's electrical generating capacity.152
Any attempt to regulate only wastes produced out of :state would have
a patently discriminatory effect. Additionally, it is suggested that
the doctrine of intergovernmental immunities would render such a statue
. l' b 1 h . d' d·' 1·· 153lnapp lca e to t e Un~te States, lts property, an ltS lnstrumenta ~t~es:
the federal government could ship such wastes into the state regardless
of a statutory prohibition; thus, the Louisiana statute which reads that
"no high level radioactive waste, including spent fuel rods from nucle.;lr
reactors, shall be transported into the state for disposal or storage in
. 1 ,,154 ld b d h d .. . c·thlS state ar e sewhere WOll e suspect un er t e eC1S10n 1n~
of Philadelphia as well as being simply inapplicable to the federal government.
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Furthermore, it is suggested that Section 1l15B of the Louisiana statute
which states that "tEJotwithstanding any law, order, or regulation to the
contrary, no salt dome within the jurisdiction of the State of Louisiana
shall be utilized as a temporary or permanent disposal site for radioactive
waste or other radioactive material of any nature by any person" seems to
l56ignore the preemptive effect of the federal scheme; and section 11150
runs afoul of the doctrine of intergovernmental immunities inasmuch as
it attempts to condition the operations of a federal agency, DOE, within
157the state.
In addition to the hereinabove considered questions as to whether
a state ~ay affect the siting of potential repositories: there are several
related legal issues. Among these are the exercise of eminent domain by
the federal government, the effect of a state government attaching conditions
158
on the use of land by the federal government, as well as the ramification
f h " "I 159 d' . ..o t e property cause an lntergovernmental lmmUnttles. However,
these issues are generally beyond the scope of this paper and have been
160thoroughly treated elsewhere. Unfortunately, the general consensus
of most commentators considering these issues (and there have been many
such commentaries) bodes a lack of success for the state. Nevertheless.
there may be another approach whereby the state can ensure a measure of
participation in this controversial area: th~ procedural requirements
of the National Environmental Polict Act (NEPA)161 may provide a forum
for state influence.
IV. Procedural Considerations Raised by NEPA
A. NEPA and the Requirement for an EIS
It is fairly ~ell established by this time that NEPA was the first
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successful attempt by Congress to establish a national goal of preventing
environmental degradation: indeed, "it is the continuing policy of the
Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local governments".,
to use all practicable means and measures" .. in a manner calculated to
162foster and promote the general welfare ... To this end, NEPA requires
As the result of broad
a series of procedural steps, including tne preparation of an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS), as part of any "major" federal action "significantly
ff . h I' f h h ' II 163a ectlng t e qua lty 0 t e uman enVlronment ,
interpretation by the courts, NEPA, with its attendant EISts, has become a
basic consideration in the decision making processes of federal agencies,
including the NRC. 164 For pursuant to NEPA, federal environmental responsibilities
"
overlap with the states l authority to protect its citizens' health and
welfare: thus, the NRC must consider "all foxeseeable envixomnenta1 impacts,,165
h .. l' h fl' . . 1 d' d' I . 1166w en lSSUlng a lcense suc as or a geo OglC reposltory, lnc U lng ra 10 og~ca
as well as non-radiological impacts.
B. The Council on Environmental Quality and its Regulations
In order to implement the policies pronounced in the act, NEPA also
created the Council on Environmental Qu~lity (CEQ),167 which has numerous
.b' 1" 168 . . f . h d .statutory respons~ ~ ~tles. Howevex, most s1gnl lcant are t e ut1es
oi CEQ, along with the subsequent responsibilities of federal agencies,
as modified by President Carter in 1977. ·Executive Order 11991 169 first
authorized and directed the issuance to all federal agencies of CEQ regulations
compelling implementation of the pxocedural provisions of NEPA; and secondly,
directed all federal agencies to comply with the regulations issued by
CEQ,170 Thus, CEQ has the authority to issue said reguLations and to
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compell federal agencies to abide by its directives: every agency ~s
compelled by this Executive Order to comply with the regulations as issued
by CEQ, except where such compliance would be inconsistent with other
statutory requirements ,171 Thus, CEQ has the means whereby it can ensure
that comprehensive envirorunental reviews are made and tl;lat the EIS's are
implemented, rather than simply prepared and then ignored.
The final CEQ regulations were promulgated in 1978: 172 the ultimate
b ' ... . f l' 1 d .. 173o ]ect~ve is to provide better and more meanLng u envlronmenta eC1Slons,
Although there are several significant changes effected by the regulations,174
the single most far reaching change is that the regulations have administratively
broadened the mandate of NEPA, Whereas NEPA only required an EIS for
major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment; the regulations expand the definition of "effects" (though
the semantical metamorphosis of "affecting" into "effects") to encompass
b h d ' d . d' . 175. 1 d' l' 1 h'ot lrect an 1n 1rect ~mpacts, ~nc u ~ng eco oglca , aest et~c,
historical, cultural, economic, social and health-related effects,176
Therefore, all future EIS's will have to encompass an expansive view of
the human environment, weighing intangibles as well as tangible impacts
affecting the natural and physical environment and the relations~ip af
people with that environment 171-both present and future generations. 178
Additionally, upon completion of a project, each agency must prepare a
"record of decision" which will report the final ac.tion taken by the
agency, including a statem~nt of what other specific considerations of
national policy overrode selecting an environmentally preferrable alternative,
if such be the case. 179 Federal agencies will now have to compile EIS IS
far more comprehensive than before,
33
C. Issues Facing the NRC as a Preparer of an EIS
The multitude, and the magnitude, of impacts that the NRC must consider
in preparing an EIS prior to deciding whether to issue a license for
. 1 . 180 '11 b f h . I f d ba part1cu ar S1te, W1 _ e ar greater t an any prev10us y ace y
a federal agency. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to identify
all such impacts, certainly two of the most important issues will be that of
socio-economic impacts and quantifying t~e envirorumental risks.
The major socia-economic impacts associated with HLW disposal will
be dependent upon two factors: the construction and operating requir,ements
for the project, including labor forces, and the specific soci,o-econornic
characterics of each site. lSI There will certainly result a "boom and
bust" cycle caused by a rapid influx of construction labor force which
then subsides to be replaced by a small operational labor force. Isolated
sites, such as the salt domes being considered in rural Northwest Louisiana,182
would experience significant stresses due to the proportionately greater
influx; additionally much commuting from metropolitan areas would result.
Immense strain will be placed upon both state and local government to
provide trational social services such as health, education, sanitation,
and transportation: the ability to allay these stresses will be only
partially offset by incr~ased revenues.
A greater difficulty will beset the NRC (and the DOE) in quantifying
short- and long-term environmental risks. An especially complex issue
is the burdening of future generations with the monitoring of these repositories.
Further, there is the even more elusive issue of exposing future generations
to risks resulting from accidental intrusion or accident. Nevertheless,
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these issues as well as the more intangible such as aesthetic, cultural,
and ecological effects must be adequately addressed by those federal
agencles preparing an EIS-- all are issues
state.
D. Louisiana's Role in the EIS Process
of great concern to an affected
It is, then, during the EIS process that an affected state will have,
perhaps, the best opportunity to affect the decision making process, either
through mediation with the federal agency during the preparation of the Ers
or during subsequent public hearings. In addition to ensuring full consideration
of socio-economic and related impacts, many uncertainties resulting from
geological and geohydrological characteristics of the area need to be
adequately addressed in order to answer an affected state's concerns.
1. Matters of Particular Concern to Louisiana
For instance, in northern Louisiana, old boreholes from wildcat oil
tests remain an unknown hydrological factor. IS3 Many of these testholes
were inadequately sealed; additionally, there is a scarcity of records
as to the full extent of such drillings. The presence of undiscovered
boreholes means that a conduit could exist between aquifers and the stor~ge
area. Furthermore, available data suggests abundant oil and gas reserves
in the ares; in addition to oil and gas, there is a large active gravel
pit near one candidate salt dome and the area shows potential lignite
184
reserves. The presence of potentially valuable natural resources increases
the risk of accidental intrusion.
And although the northern Louisiana s~lt domes appear tectonically
185
stable, there are still unresolved questions about the stability of
'f' d . 186a specl lC orne, Vacher~e. Furthermore, while such stability is a
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necessary requirement for a repository site, equally important is ascertaining
1 . 1 b'1' 187the geohydro og1ca sta 1 lty. Current evidence suggests that at
( ) b · . 1 . 188least one of the sites Rayburns may be su Jeet to dlSS0 utlon: the
shallow depth below ground of which this dome is found raises questions
about the chance of contact with the prolific fresh water aquifers in
the shallow strata and the degree to which the dome is insulated from
the effects of surface water.
The possibility that water circulation could exist in the secondary
openings in the salt or the possibility that the repository chamber could
be breached 1S most serious as the occurrence of either would correspondingly
increase the liklihooa that radioactive waste could be exposed to the
groundwater system. Of critical concern wou1d be the breaching of the
repository chamber as this would probably be followed immediately by
flooding of the cavity with soluble radionuclides taken up and transported
by the water in the direction of ground water flow. Furthermore, the
heat generated by the waste would tend to exacerbate only hydrological
instability, thus endangering major aquifers used by nearby municipalities.
Hence, it is important that the state itself begin to evaluate the suitability
of such repositories in light of the biological, physical, and chemical
environment of the area,
-2. Approaches Available to an Affected State
If, after initial assessment of the suitability of potential sites
located within its boundaries, a state deC1des that it wishes to participate
in the deeision making process, there are several approaches of wnich it
mignt avail itself.
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First, the state might wish to submit a proposal to the NRc outlining
a program of participation and t if necessarYt requesting needed resources.
This would, then. insure full access to relevant data as it 18 compiled and
submitted on a pa~ticular site: it would also provide a means of input into
the NRC decision-making process. including that agency's preparation of an
190
EIA.
The state might also wish to establish direct communications with the
DO~. As the DO~ must prepare an EIS prior to submitting an application for
191
construction authorization to the NRC, the state shouLd raise issues with
that agency which it feels should be addressed in the document. Indeed,
the state may feel that problems raised by the proposed siting are of such
magnitude that the site is inappropriate 1n the state's opinlon. Communi-
cation ot this information to the UOE should result in a careful evaluation
ot the suggested problem areas. If, however, the agency is unresponsive to
state concerns, the state may wish to contest the matter by apsertlng~ via
litigation, the inadequacy of the ~IS as prepared, i.e., the EIs failed to
address those issues of concern. Because such a challenge frequently resuLts
in a complicated as well as extensive process and because the agency has
been mandated a rather strict timetable for having an operational repository,
the mere possibility of such an action occurring may suftice to encourage the
oOE to be more responsive to the part~cular concerns of a state. In fact,
suCh an approach may be far more advantageous to a state than a direct
judicial c0nfrontation with the federal government over a state statute.
j7
v. Conclusion
The feaeral government 1S intent on overcoming past deficiencies in
es tab 1ish ing a teas ib.le na t ional was t e management program: now ~ the emphas is
is on developing a comprehensive program, including repositories for receipt
of wastes within the next ten years. In their role as constituents of tbe
federal system and because of the numerous technical, biological, and
institu tional uncertainties which remain to be addressed, each individual
state should carefully monitor the emerging program: this is especially
true tor those states who may find themselves host to a waste reposltory
within their boundaries.
If such a state is uncertain about the adequacy of the federal program
or otherwise remains unconvinced ahout the acceptabillty of the program or
the suitability of a particular site, it behooves the state to carefully
assess the extent to which it may participate; either legislatlvely or
administratively. ~or the state wnich prefers not to be a host for a
repository, it is unfortunate that the jud1cial system seems to support the
192
feaeral government's assertion ot dominance Nevertheless, that does not
mean that the state is precluded, rat!;ler, new approache.s must be considered.
In tact, the newer approaches may be far more effective. ce.rtainly,
the abundance of literature on the subject combined with the enhanced
capabilities of state official s in this ar~ provides impetus tor a state
to assert its attitude about the program and possible ramifications; indeed,
it is incumbent upon the state to do so in view of its constitutionally
recognized role as providor of social services and protector of the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens. The federal government can not afford
to ignore the legitimate concerns of an aftected state.
However, the state itself must take an active stance in these matters!
It must assess the options available to it and decide which best comports
with the pa~ticularities of the area. Careful consideration should be gLven
to developing a thorough understanding of devices which provide a forum tor
state vi·ews. But the state must begin to act now tor although the federal
program has languished for nearly thirty years, it is e~pected to become
fUlly operat~onal within the next t~n.
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APPt.NDIX A
f.J:~nc ~p l,~~ _C?! U~!J ~J~ ~~S ~(H1_di!"lSI
In accordance with discussions between representatives of
the Department of Energy ("DOE") and the state of
Louisinna, the parties hereby agL'ee that to the extent
permi-tted by law, they will use their best effo:i'4..to
adhere to the followrng policies and practices with respect
to development of the strategic Petroleum Reserve in the
state of Louisiana:
1. Napolepnvif1e Salt Dome--DOE use of this salt
dome and others in Louisiana for strategic petrolewn
storage will be acceptable to the State, so long as no
employees of industries utilizing the domes are displaced
in their jobs by the Department of Energy in its storage
operations.
2. Atcha.falaya Pipeline--The State will support the
proposed pipeline extending from st. James Terminal to
Weeks Island, provided that activities In laying the line
through the Atchafalaya Basin will not be undertaken until
after July I, 1978, and that applicable environmental and
goverlmental regulations are adhered to.
3. Backup Operations--DOE will give all due
consideration to barging operations as an available backup
method to pipeline transportation of strategic reserves in
emergencies. In particular, barging facilities at the Port
A-I
of NC'"l Iberia, and the accompanylng dredging ilnd deepening
of the channel there will be studied. DOE will make
available immediately $300,000 to the U.S, Corps of
Engineers to be spent in 1978 for the preparation of an
environmental impact statement and urge an early decision
for the New Iberia ~roject.
4. Compensation--DOE will pay the state $1,289,082
for the state's interest in the West Hackberry Salt Dome,
located on 35 acres of state-owned land under Black Lake in
Cameron Parish.
5. Docking Fac:ili ties.: st. James Tel:minal--The
state will support the permitting, construction and main-
tenance of the St. James Terminal as a docking facility,
6. Well Pad Construction: Bayou Choctaw and
~~ckberry--The state will support the permitting of well
pad facilities at these two salt domes.
7 . SubiI?e RiverIHackberry Pip~line--The state will
support the granting of permits and rights of way for the
proposed pipeline extending from the Sabine River Crossing
to the HacY~erry salt Dome.
8. NucJlear S~orage-~All Federal Government studies
relating to nuclear waste disposal in the Vacherie Salt
Dome in Webster Parish and the Rayburn's Salt Dome In
Bienville Parish will be subject to this stipulation: The
-
Department of Energy will not construct any nuclear waste
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repository in Louisiana if the Strite objects. Shldies of
possible areas in Louisiana as 'rlell as in ot.her states
would continue with some test drilling which will always be
preceded by complete discussions with state officials.
9. Sub-qJfice--The Department of Energy will open a
sub-office in New Orleans, accommodating some 200 federal
and contractor employees.
10. Reversionary Rights--with res~ect to any
donations by the state of property to the Federal
Government, DOE agrees that when the use to which the
property was donated ceases, the state will have the right
of first refusal with respect to acquisition of the
Deputy Secretary
Department of En/,
Date 2. - 2-/ -?cY
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APPENDIX B
T. States Imposing A Ban
A. Ban on all HLW
Louisiana:
R.S. 30:1115 B. prohibits the disposal of nuclear waste in salt domes. No
tests to determine the suitability of salt domes for disposal may be conducted
unless the par~h government, the natural resources committees of the state
House and senate, and the secretary of the Dept. of Nat'l Resources have been
notified. Further, if any of the above parties objects to the testing, it must
cease immediately.
Maryland:
Ann. Code 43-689 B. states that it is unlawful to establish any long-term
or permanent storage facility, burial ground or other such installation. wastes
can be temporarily stored until June 30, 1980 if the Sec. of Health and Mental
Hygiene determines that storage is:
1) necessary;
2) in the public interest;
3) unlikely to cause any risk of leakage or release of radiation; and
4) is stored within a facility designed and regularly tested so as to
safely accomplish long term storage.
Michigan:
Stat. Ann. 14.528(351) and (352) state that radioactive wastes may not be
deposited or stored within the state. The ban does not apply to: facilities at
educational institutions, spent fuel storage pools at existing nuclear power plants,
mill tailings from uranium mining conducted within the state, medical uses of
radioactive material, or temporary storage of low-level waste for not more than
60 months which was being stored before Jan. 1, 1970.
Oregon:
O.R.S. 469.500-.510 gave the Energy Facility Siting Council extensive
authority to regulate all powerplants, but imposed some standards applicable
only to nuclear related activity, including the promulgation of rules for the
proper management and monitoring of radioactive wastes. Applicants for site
certificates must agree to abide by the Council's rules, which forbid the
establishment or operation of radioactive waste disposal facilities within the
state.
B. Bans on wastes generated from without the state
Arizona:
R.S. 30-691 provides that no license shall be granted for the disposal of
any radioactive waste that originated as waste from outside the state (however,
the statute appears to refer only to low-level wastes) .
Montana:
Rev. Code. Mt. 75-3-302 prohibits the disposal of large quantity radioactive
material (as defined in 40 CFR l73.389(b» produced in other states. As for
in-state waste, Montana has additional provisions which may be found in category
III, i.e. approval through a popular referendum is required.
II-States which relate the continued construction and operation of nuclear plants
to the development of a safe and demonstrable technology for disposal of wastes
california:
Ca. Public Resources Code 25524.2: this HLW Disposal Provision delays the
approval of nuclear fission thermal power plants until the State Energy Commission
finds that the NRC "has approved and there exists a demonstrated technology or
means for the disposal of HLW", and until the legislature has reviewed the state
Commission's findings. Thus, it requires a delay until a "permanent and terminal
disposition" of the waste can be achieved through existing technology. Calif.
B-2
has conditioned permission to construct new plants within the state on an
appropriately documented federal determination that the containment problem can
be permanently resolved.
Connecticut:
C.G.S.A. 19-409 D. conditions new construction of nuclear power plants on
the identification and approval of a demonstrable technology for disposal of HLW.
Additionally, no burial of waste may be made unless the general assembly finds
that no significant adverse effects will occur and approves, by a special act,
the burial.
Wisconsin:
The Public Services Commission issued an order (Docket #05-EP-l) dated
August 17, 1978, stating that no nuclear power plants shall be planned or applied
for (except those already under consideration) until reasonable progress,
satisfactory to the PSC, has been made in resolving waste disposal and decommission-
ing issues. (9 Envir. Rep. BNA 77-08 (1978»
III-States requiring legislative or popular approval
Maine:
R.S.A. l-lS-A states that the approval of the legislature is needed for the
state to consent to the acquisition by the federal governemtn of any land,
building .•. for storage, disposal or treatment of radioactive waste. This does
not apply to spent fuel from presently operating power plants when stored in
on-site facilities pursuant to a certificate issued under R.S.A. 10-251 et seq.
Minnesota:
prohibits the construction or operation of a waste managment facility
unless authorized by the legislature. Prohibits the transport of wastes into
the state for disposal or storage unless authorized by the legislature, excepting
temporary storage for up to 12 months pending transport out of the state.
(found in Means for Improving state participation in t~e Siting, Licensing, and
:R ...
Development of Federal Nuclear Waste Facilities, USNRC, NUREG-Q539 (March 1979)
at D-3.)
Mississippi:
Miss. Code 17-17-49 states that no salt dome or other geologic structure
shall be the site of long-term or terminal disposal or long-term storage of HLW
or other high-level material except as provided. If any person desires to
conduct a study of suitibility, he sahll notify the division of radiological health
of the state board of health, the Miss. Mineral Resources Institute, and the cept.
of Natural Resources. Results of the study shall be made available to the above
persons and to the governor. The DNR and the GOvernor are to determine the
advisibility of storage and make their recommendations to the division of
radiological health. only after receipt of favorable recommendations, may the
division of radiological health grant approval for disposal and storage.
Montana:
R.C.M. 75-20-1201 provides that the people of Montana reserve the exclusive
right to determine whether any nuclear facilities are to be built and operated
within the state. R.C.M. 75-20-1202 states clearly that a nuclear facility
includes facilities which generate, reprocess, store or dispose of nuclear
wastes. Further, even after approval, no facility may be constructed unless:
1) there are no limits to liability for accidents;
2) the effectiveness of safety systems has been demonstrated in tests;
3) the facility is impervious to leakage or release of contaminants during
the time it remains a radiological hazard; and
4) the operator must post a bond for decommissioning costs which is not
less than 30% of the total capital cost of the facility.
New Mexico:
N.M.S.A. 74-4A-2 et seq express the concern of the state over the proposed
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). No storage or disposal of wastes may occur
until the state has €oncurred. It is interesting to note that DOE gave absolute
veto power to the state over the siting and construction of the WIPP.
1L4
North Dakota:
century Code 23-20.2-09 provides that no radioactive waste may be bxought
into the state for disposal without the prior approval of the legislative
assembly.
New York:
L. 1979, chaps. 614 and 615 require both gubernatorial and legislative
approval before a repository for the terminal storage of nuclear waste may be
sited, constructed or operated in New York State. In order to assist the
Governor and the legislature in making their determination as to the need and
safety of such facilities, the NY state Energy Research and Development Authority
shall:
1) conduct a study of all issues involved, including health, safety, and
fiscal;
2) solicit and evaluate recommendations from appropriate state agencies;
3) prepare and EIS;
4) determine whether technology and the site will not result in a threat
to public health; and
5) hold public hearings throughout the state to receive public opinion.
south Dakota:
Compiled Laws 34-21-1.1 bans the containment, disposal or deposit of HLW,
radioactive substances or radioactively contaminated materials or the processing
of HLW within the state unless prior approval is grant by the legislature.
Exempts uranium ore and mill tailings from the provisions of the statute.
Vermont:
V.S.A 10-6501 bans the construction or establishment of a HLW repository
within the state unless the General Assembly approves it, through either a bill
or joint resolution. Yankee Nuclear Power plant was specifically excluded as
to spent fuel stored on-site.
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